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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
GRANITE SCHOOL DISTRICT, a
Statutory corporation,
Plain tiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case
No. 9844

REX H. COX and WILMINA COX,
his wife,

Defendants-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Statement of the nature of the case and disposition
in lower court are adequate as stated in appellant's brief.

RELIEF SO·UGHT O·N APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks sustainment of the lower court's order
denying defendant Rex H. Cox' motion to set aside the
default judgment.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts should be considered in addition to the statements made in defendants' brief. On or
about the 20th day of February, 1961, defendants gave a
written offer to the plaintiff for the sale to plaintiff of
the property described in the Complaint for the sum of
$43,500.00. (R. 72-Ex 1-D). This offer was rejected
and a counter offer of $40,000.00 made by the plaintiff,
and on the 17th day of April, 1961, defendants, by written communication, rejected the said offer of $40,000.00
made by the plaintiff and stated, ((We wish to compromise
and accept the sum of $42,000.00." This was signed by
((Rex H. Cox". (R. 72, Ex 2-D).
After numerous attempts to have defendants convey
said property, the plaintiff, through one of its attorneys,
tendered to the defendants a check (R. 34) for the purchase price of $42,000.00 less revenue stamps and prorated
taxes. Defendants refused to execute the deed. Thereafter, the plaintiff's attorney informed the defendant,
Rex H. Cox, that in the event a transaction could not be
completed amicably, he was instructed by the Board of
Education of the Granite School District to bring suit
against the defendants. The defendant, Rex H. Cox,
informed this attorney for plaintiff that he should go
ahead and bring suit. (R. 3 5). Complaint was filed
August 31, 1962 and a copy of the Summons together
with a copy of the Complaint was served personally upon
the defendants Wilmina Cox and Rex H. Cox by leaving a
copy with Wilmina Cox, the defendant's wife (R. 6).
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ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED
ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE MO~TIO~N OF
DEFENDANT REX H. cox TOI SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT.
As stated by the court in Quely vs. Willardson, 3 5
Utah 414, 100 P 930,:

HAll that the court could oass on at the hearing on
the motion was whether ;ppellants had presented
a meritorious defense in their answer and whether
they had shown sufficient excuse for not presenting
such defense at the proper time."
Defendant Rex H. Cox does not comply with either requirement. No defense was presented and no proposed
answer for defendant Rex H. Cox has been submitted.
Defendant Rex H. Cox admits that he was told by
plaintiff's attorney that plaintiff had instructed him to
bring suit if the defendants refused to execute the deed
tendered. (R. 3 5). He admitted that he saw the Summons and the copy of the Complaint that were served on
him (R. 3 5, 44, 45 and 46) and admitted that he did not
neglect but he just refused to do anything about this matter by asking advice of an attorney or otherwise and at no
time had any intention to do so. (R. 35, 44,45 and 46). Defendant further admits that he knew that there had been
two letters sent by certified mail, returned receipt requested, that had been waiting in the post office, addressed
to him and his wife, and had failed, neglected, and refused
to pick up the said letters. (R. 3 5 and 3 6). All of this
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seems to fit in with the pattern of defendant's previous
conduct in which he agreed to sell the property but did
nothing and refused to complete the transaction. At the
time of service, defendant Rex H. Cox discussed this
matter with his wife and, according to his testimony,
ui smoothed it over and made her feel better about it."
(R. 44). This defendant's inaction was deliberate. The
court summed it up in the following words, ((Accordingly,
I can't believe his testimony and I think what he did in
failing to make his appearance or get counsel and respond
to the Summons was deliberate on his part." (R. 54).
Although the State of Utah has always had a very
liberal policy in setting aside default judgments, all cases
have required a showing of inadvertance, surprise, or excusable neglect, none of which appears in this case.
In the case of Chrysler vs. Chrysler, 5 Utah 2d 415,
303 P2nd 995, the court says in part as follows:
uCertain it is that under usual circumstances
it is inequitable and unjust to condemn a party
unheard and that doubts should be resolved in
favor of setting aside a default judgment to permit
the parties to have their day in court. The authorities are uniform to that effect. It will be found,
however, that these cases are predicated upon the

hypothesis that there has been some mistake or excusable neglect on the part of the movant from
which, in justice and equity, he should be relieved.
The pertinent inquiry here is whether plaintiff met
that requirement.'' (Emphasis added)
Certainly the defendant has not met the requirement
~s stated above. It is recognized that the moving party
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should be diligent and show that he is prevented from
avoiding a default judgment because of circumstances
over which he had no control. In this regard the court
states in Warren vs. Dixon Ranch Con~pany, et al (cited
by defendant), 123 Utah 416, 260 P2d 741 and 743:
t(Discretion must be exercised in furtherance
of justice and the court will incline toward granting relief in a doubtful case to the end that the
party may have a hearing. Hurd v. Ford, 74 Utah
46, 276 P 908. However, the movant must show
that he has used due diligence a.nd that he was pre-

vented from appearing by circumstances over
which he had no control. Peterson v. Crosier, 29
Utah 235, 81 P 860." (Emphasis added)
The court goes on to say in the same case, Warren vs.

Dixon Ranch Company:
ccln order for this court to overturn the dis-·
cretion of the lower court in refusing to vacate
a valid judgment, the requirements of public policy

demand more than a mere statement that a person
did not have his day in court when full opportunity
for a fair hearing was afforded to him or his legal
representative." (Emphasis added)
Attention is invited to the fact that in the case of
Warren v. Dixon Ranch Com.pany cited in appellant's
brief, this court sustained the lower court's order denying
the motion to set aside the default judgment. The defendant there had much more to support his motion than
exists in this case. There is not a single case that has been
decided wherein the defendant has with full knowledge
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of the service of Summons with the contents of the Summons and the contents of the Complaint and has refused
to take any action and then has been successful in having
the judgment set aside. In each instance where default
judgment has been set aside there has been some special
circumstance that has shown excusable neglect. See Kelly
vs. Scott, 5 Utah 2d 159, 298 P2d 821, Ney vs. Harrison,
5 Utah 2d 217, 299 P2d 1114, Utah Commercial Savings
Bank vs. Trumbo, 17 Utah 198, 53 P 1033, and Locke vs.
Peterson, 3 Utah 2d 415, 285 P2d 1111.

Taylor vs. E. M. Royle Corporation 1 Utah 2d 175,
264 P2d 279 (cited in defendants' brief as 264 P2d 880),
does not support the question before the court.
Plaintiff in that case sued on an express contract and
without proof the lower court allowed recovery on quantum meruit. The Supreme Court held an injustice would
result if the rule were interpreted to charge the defendant
with liability under quantum meruit, an issue he was never
called upon to meet.
The case of E. ]. Mayhew vs. Standard Gilsonite
Company and Beaver Dam Sales C01nPany vs. Standard
Gilsonite, 14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P2d 951, was cited in
defendants' brief. Service of Summons was made on
the former president of defendant corporation who informed the person serving that he was not an officer of
the defendant corporation. The following excerpt from
Justice Crockett's opinion is significant:
ult is important to keep in mind that we are
not here concerned with the rights of R. ]. Pinder
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
personally, but with those of stockholders in the
corporation who seek an opportunity to assert their
rights and protect their interests."

Heathman vs. Fabian and Clendenin, 377 P2d 189,
cited in defendants' brief is not in point as the question of
the right of the court in its discretion to set aside a default
judgment was not directly involved. The court stated
immediately following the portion quoted as follows:

celt was clearly the duty of the law firm to do
what it could, acting fairly and openly, to prevent
the court from entering a default judgment against
Hatch without hearing its .claim that the default
certificate was obtained on account of excusable
neglect."
Attention is also invited to the following cases:

McWhirter vs. Donaldson et al, 36 Utah 293, 104 P
731. In this case the defendant's attorney claimed that
he had a verbal stipulation with the plaintiff's attorney to
give additional time to answer. The court denied the
motion to set aside judgment and this was affirmed on
appeal.
Peterson vs. Crozier, 29 Utah 235, 81 P 860.

Defendant in this case was also represented by an attorney
who filed an answer but did not appear for trial. Defendant at one time apparently intended to abandon
his defense but thereafter tendered an amended answer
and moved to set aside the judgment. The lower court
den1ed the motion to set aside the judgment and this was
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affirmed on appeal.
follows:

The court on appeal said in part as

((In order to bring a case within the foregoing
provision of the statute, the moving party must
show that he has used due diligence to prepare
and appear for trial and present his defense and
that he was prevented from doing so because of
some accident, misfortune or combination of circumstances over which he had no control. If, haw-

ever, the record discloses mere carelessness, lack of
attention or indifference to his rights on the part
of applicant or his counsel, he cannot expect an
opportunity to redeem the past. If the party's
negligence is without excuse or justification, he
must abide the consequences." (Emphasis added)
Bylund vs. Crook, 60 Utah 285, 208 P 504. The defendant bank's motion to set aside default judgment was
denied and this was affirmed on appeal. This was a foreclosure suit in which the bank joined as a defendant
because it held a second mortgage. It appeared that the
bank knew of and encouraged the plaintiff in the foreclosure proceedings right up to and including the sale
of the property.
The case of Masters vs. LeSuer, 13 Utah 2d 293, 373
P2d 573. The defendant was represented by an attorney
who thought he had filed an answer. It appeared that
before default judgment plaintiff's attorney called the
defendant's attorney's attention to the fact that the matter was in default and that default judgment would be
taken unless something was done. The order denying the
motion to set aside default judgment was affirmed.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion it is submitted:
That the trial court properly exercised its discretion
in denying the Motion to Set Aside Judgment as to defendant Rex H. Cox. There is not a shred of evidence to
show that there was any mistake, inadvertence, surprise
or excusable neglect. As a matter of fact, defendant Rex
H. Cox, by his own admission, had full knowledge of the
bringing of suit, he had knowledge in the first place that
it was going to be brought and yet he deliberately refused
to carry out the direction in the Summons and present
a defense. This is deliberate defiance of the court and
now he asks the court to exercise its discretion in setting
it aside.
The judgment of the lower court refusing to set aside
the default judgment against Rex H. Cox should be
sustained.
McKAY AND BURTON
By REED H. RICHARDS
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
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